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ABSTRACT
This paper develops an original measure of learning in higher education, based on grades in subsequent
courses. Using this measure of learning, this paper shows that student evaluations are positively related
to current grades but unrelated to learning once current grades are controlled. It offers evidence that
the weak relationship between learning and student evaluations arises, in part, because students are
unaware of how much they have learned in a course. The paper concludes with a discussion of easily-implemented,
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I. Introduction and Background 
Given the difficulties associated with accurate assessments of teaching effectiveness, 
student evaluations traditionally have been the primary, if not the only, means of assessing 
teaching in higher education.
1 With the Miller Commission’s focus on accountability in higher 
education, evaluation methods are receiving increasing public attention (United States 
Department of Education [2006]; Golden [2006]). While assessment is never easy, the wide-
range of subjects taught makes assessment in higher education particularly difficult. 
This paper develops a procedure for optimally assessing instructor quality that is easily 
implemented.  This procedure applies basic regression techniques to data that are already 
available in machine-readable form at most or all institutions. It is based on a unique measure of 
the learning acquired in a section of a course based on the grades that the students in that section 
receive in subsequent courses in the same subject (adjusting for student characteristics). The 
availability of a learning measure allows us to investigate how students reward instructors for 
learning as well as for the grades the receive in their current course. 
Economists and educational psychologists both have studied how grades and learning are 
related to student evaluations of teaching but in a way that prevents one from inferring whether 
students reward higher grades, more learning, or both. Instructors are expected to give higher 
grades to better performing students, making it necessary to control for both grades and learning 
when assessing the determinants of student evaluations. Surprisingly, we are unaware of studies 
that have considered both factors together. While the existing literature has not convincingly 
demonstrated that students reward learning and not grading leniency, even without these issues, 
student evaluations generate an incentive for instructors to inflate grades and almost surely place 
too little weight on learning. 
There is a substantial literature on evaluations of teaching in educational psychology, 
                                                 
1 White (1995) reports that U.S. economics departments predominantly use SET’s to measure teaching 
effectiveness.    He notes that there appears to be strong reluctance to rely on direct observation of teaching, 
particularly among research-oriented departments.   2
comprising thousands of items (Feldman [1997]). Fortunately there are a number of large-scale 
literature reviews. This literature focuses on the relationship between student evaluations and 
various measures of learning and generally finds a strong relationship. The most persuasive 
evidence for a link between learning and evaluations comes from multi-section courses with 
common syllabi and exams (Cohen [1981]; Dowell and Neal [1982]; Marsh [1984, 1987, 2006]; 
Abrami, d’Apollonia, and Rosenfield [1997]; Feldman [1997]; and Theall and Feldman [2006]). 
The lack of instructor discretion in these courses raises questions about the extent to which these 
results will generalize to other courses. More importantly, this design is not suitable for 
determining how grades and learning separately affect evaluations because there is little if any 
variation in grades conditional on learning. Ironically, discussions with our students suggest that 
they often estimate how much they have learned in a course from the grade that they expect to 
receive.
2  If so, in multi-section classes, students’ estimates of their learning will be highly 
correlated with their grades. The literature has noted that estimates of the effect of learning on 
student evaluations may be biased by grades. Because the multi-section design makes it virtually 
impossible to estimate the effect of grades and learning separately, educational psychologists 
have generally relied on indirect methods to address the effect of grading leniency (see, for 
example, Greenwald and Gillmore [1997]).
3 
The literature on the economics of education is less sanguine about the relationship 
between learning and evaluations. It has focused on how grades affect evaluations, providing 
evidence that high grades raise student evaluations and argued that the use of evaluations may 
lead to grade inflation.
4 Results from empirical work linking expected grades to evaluations are 
                                                 
2 This view was expressed at a presentation of this work at our Undergraduate Economics Society at our university 
at which approximately 30 students were in attendance. 
3 In the economics literature Sheets, Topping, and Hoftyzer [1995] employ a multi-section approach. Shmanske 
[1988] uses grades in a subsequent course in a two-course sequence, which is related to our approach but much less 
widely applicable. Neither study includes current grades. 
4 Becker and Watts (1999) criticize economics departments for “following the herd” in their uncritical use of SET 
measures and not applying the same rigor they require of published research to the use and understanding of  
teaching-quality survey instruments to evaluate the performance of their faculty.  Kanagaretnam, Mathieu, and 
Thevaranjan (2003) cite several articles from the Chronicle of Higher Education dealing with the topic of the 
impact of SET’s on student learning and grade inflation.  McKenzie (1975) develops a simple model of consumer   3
mixed.
5 This paper departs from this work in two ways. First, it uses actual course grades rather 
than expected grades. While students generally do not receive grades until after completing their 
evaluations, we prefer to use actual grades because expected grades are likely to be quite noisy 
and students have some idea of what grades they may receive based on midterm results, 
homework scores, and other objective information on their course performance as well as 
possible signals from the instructor. Second, unlike most of the literature, this paper measures 
grades using the average grade in a section rather than individual-level grades. In an individual-
level regression, most of the variation in grades arises from individual differences in grades 
within a section. Therefore, the individual-level relationship between grades and evaluations 
indicates whether students who are at the top of a given section give higher evaluations than 
those at the bottom of that section, not whether instructors who grade more leniently receive 
higher evaluations. Third, as indicated above, this paper is also the first to study how grades and 
learning are jointly related to evaluations. 
 We use our analysis of the determinants of student evaluations to suggest improved 
methods for evaluating instructors. Educational psychologists have argued that if there is little 
effect of grades on evaluations but there is a strong relationship between grades and learning, 
one would not want to adjust student evaluations for grades (Greenwood and Gillmore [1997]). 
If evaluations were affected by grades, however, it would be advisable to adjust evaluations for 
grades, provided that one can condition on learning.  Such an adjustment would reduce instructor 
incentives to inflate grades and remove a source of bias in evaluations. 
There are two additional factors that arise when relying on student evaluations. First 
student evaluations depend on students’ assessment and valuation of how much they have 
                                                                                                                                                             
choice in which the use of SET’s by academic institutions provide an incentive for instructors to alter the grade-
effort tradeoff that students face to make it easier (less costly in terms of effort) to earn higher grades.  This 
contributes to grade inflation and adversely affects the institution’s ability to distinguish good and bad students.  A 
search of the Chronicle’s  table of contents for the key words “student evaluation” yields 22 articles and notes for 
the year 2005 (through the end of October).  A search for both “student evaluation” and “grade inflation” yields six 
letters and articles between 1998 and 2005, for example, Benton (2004). 
5 Nichols and Soper [1972]; Krautmann and Sander [1999]; Boex [2000]; and Kelley [1971] report a positive 
relationship between expected grades and evaluations, while DeCanio [1986] and Nelson and Lynch [1984]; and   4
learned in a course. Below, we provide evidence that student evaluators may not be well 
positioned to make that determination accurately. Even if students accurately assess their 
learning, they may place less weight than universities do on learning relative to the course 
experience. For example, society and parents may place higher weight on human capital 
production and less weight on the course experience than students do because students discount 
at a high rate or because human capital generates externalities for society. In either case, relying 
solely on student evaluations will distort instructors’ incentives away from the social optimum. 
This paper fits into an emerging literature on the determinants of outcomes in higher 
education (see Bettinger and Long [2004]; Beddard and Kuhn [2005]; and Hoffmann and 
Oreopoulos [2006]). It also relates to a large literature in the economics of education on the 
determinants of student outcomes in primary and secondary education. 
Our data cover nearly fifty thousand enrollments in almost four hundred offerings of 
principles of microeconomics, principles of macroeconomics, and intermediate microeconomics 
over a decade at The Ohio State University.
6 In addition to information on student evaluations, 
the data contain all grades that students received in subsequent economics courses and rich 
information on student background, including race, gender, ethnicity, high school class rank and 
SAT and/or ACT scores.  These data can be used to regression-adjust grades and our learning 
measure. The data show a strong positive relationship between student evaluations and both 
current grades and learning when these variables are included separately, but when these 
variables are included in the same model, the current grade is related to student evaluations but 
learning is not. There are many potential explanations for these results, including a variety of 
selection arguments. We devote considerable effort to five of them, concluding that, on average, 
students are not aware of how much they have learned in a class.  There are no reasons to believe 
that the focus on current grades and uncertainty about learning is specific to economics or the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Bosshardt and Watts [2001] report weak, negative, or mixed results. 
6 These courses were chosen because they are standard, they enroll the most students, and more of the students in 
these classes take additional economics classes. These were the only classes for which data were collected or 
analyzed.   5
institution studied and therefore our results are expected to generalize, at least qualitatively. 
The availability of a measure of learning and the checks that we run on it entail a number 
of analyses that are of interest in their own right.  For example, we also consider how instructor 
characteristics are related to measures of the quality of teaching. In some cases, female and 
foreign-born instructors receive lower student evaluations than male and US-born instructors. 
Learning, however, is not systematically related to instructor gender or national origin, nor are 
there systematic differences in evaluations or student learning between non-tenure track faculty 
and tenure track faculty. This finding is noteworthy in light of Ehrenberg’s (2004) observation 
that little is known about the effect of part-time and non tenure-track faculty on student learning 
and other measures of academic production. While we do not find that observable instructor 
characteristics are related to learning, we do find large variations across instructors in learning 
performance. This result is consistent with evidence from primary and secondary education (See 
Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain [2005]). 
We also investigate whether students in sections that rate their instructors more highly 
are more likely to take additional classes, a revealed-preference measure of quality (see 
Hoffmann and Oreopoulos [2006]). We find that student evaluations of teaching are unrelated to 




The data set includes students who took principles of microeconomics, principles of 
macroeconomics or intermediate microeconomics at The Ohio State University between 1995 
and 2004, and contains identifiers for the sections the students took, student demographic 
characteristics, and grades in all economics courses taken during this period. They also contain 
rich background information on students, including race, gender, ethnicity, high school class 
                                                 
7 Two obvious additional measures are drop rates and wait lists. Wait lists are uncommon in these courses and the 
measure of drop rates includes students who dropped before the beginning of the class as well as those who dropped 
once the course began.   6
rank and SAT and/or ACT scores that can be used to regression-adjust grades and our learning 
measure.  In the regressions, ACT scores are included for students for whom we have them and 
SAT scores are included for students for whom we do not have ACT scores (because ACT 
scores are available for more students). The estimates include a dummy variable for which score 
is included. We obtained data on all subsequent economics courses taken by these students 
through the end of academic year 2004.  Student evaluations are anonymous and are available at 
the section-level but not at the student-level.  Thus, we estimate the relationship between grades 
and evaluations at the section level rather than at the individual level, which is appropriate, as 
discussed above. 
The evaluation instruments contain ten items, including an overall score, which is the 
principal measure of student evaluation used in this study.  Other questions include measures of 
perceived learning, preparation and organization, the instructor’s attitude, and the extent to 
which the course stimulated students to think. 
Table 1 shows the variable definitions and their means and standard deviations for the 
three sets of courses. The data set comprises 190 sections (with 26,666 students) in principles of 
microeconomics; 119 sections (with 14,729 students) in principles of macroeconomics; and 86 
sections (with 4,111 students) in intermediate microeconomics. The average evaluation score 
ranges from 3.72 (standard deviation of .54) for principles of macroeconomics to 3.86 (standard 
deviation of .44) for principles of microeconomics on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest).  The 
average course grade is close to 2.7 on a four-point scale (with a standard deviation of about .3), 
a B-, for all three courses. The table shows the distribution of instructor and student 
characteristics for the three courses. 
III. Estimation 
We employ a three-step strategy to estimate grades and learning and their relationship to 
student evaluations: (i) we first estimate grades (ii) then we estimate the amount of learning in 
each section based on grades in subsequent sections; (iii) finally we use these learning estimates 
to assess how grades and learning are related to evaluations.  In addition, we analyze these   7
learning measures since they are of interest in their own right.   
This section describes the procedure step-by-step in terms of principles of 
microeconomics, including how individual-level data on current and subsequent grades are 
collapsed to the section-level to be merged into section-level evaluations. Similar procedures 
were used for principles of macroeconomics and intermediate macroeconomics. 
Step 1. Estimating Grades 
Let i index students and s index the base section (i.e. the particular section of principles 
of microeconomics that the student took). Let  is g  denote the grade received by student i who 
took base section s.  In the first step,  is g  is regressed on a vector of base section dummy 
variables  is D
v




is is is is D X g 1 1 ε ψ β + ′ + ′ =
v v v v
   (1) 
The coefficient  s ψ on the dummy variable for base section s gives the mean grade in the section 
adjusting for individual characteristics. These coefficients are used in the third stage to represent 
grades. 
Step 2. Estimating Learning 
Grades in subsequent courses are used to measure learning.  Let j index sections of 
subsequent economics courses, so that  isj g  denotes the grade of student i, who took base section 
s, in subsequent section j. Grades in subsequent courses,  isj g , are regressed on a vector of 
dummy variables for the subsequent section (to control for differences in grading across classes), 
isj Z
v
; a vector of dummy variables for the base section,  isj D
v
; and student characteristics,  isj X
v
, at 
the time of section j. Formally, 
isj isj isj isj isj D Z X g 2 2 ε θ β + ′ + Γ ′ + ′ =
v v v v v v
   (2) 
The coefficient  s θ on the dummy variable for students who took base section s indicates how 
well these students do in later courses adjusting for their characteristics.  This coefficient is our   8
measure of learning, or human capital produced in section s. The  s θ  we estimate in this stage are 
used in our third step to control for learning produced in the section and the estimates are of 
interest in their own right. 
Step 3. Evaluating Student Evaluations 
Having estimated  s ψ , the grades in base section s and  s θ , the learning in base section s, 
we now regress the student evaluations for base section s,  s e , on learning, grades, and instructor 
and section characteristics,  s W
v
: 
s s g s l s s W e 3 ε ρ φ ψ φ θ + ′ + + =
v v
.   (3) 
The coefficient  l φ  indicates how much students value learning (net of any costs of 
learning) and the coefficient  g φ , how much students value high grades when evaluating the 
instructor.  The coefficient vector ρ
v
 tells how observable instructor and section characteristics 
are related to evaluations. 
Additional Analyses 
Once we obtain a measure of learning, we can estimate a variety of related effects.  We 
investigate the effect of instructor characteristics such as gender, native language, tenure track 
status, or whether or not the instructor is a graduate teaching associate, on learning by 
estimating, 
s s s u W + = 3 'β θ
v r
.        (4.1) 
As above,  s W  would represent the characteristics of section s, including those of the instructor.  
We also assess how instructor characteristics are associated with grading leniency, by 
estimating, 
s s s s W ξ γ θ β ψ + + = 4 '
v v
.     (4.2) 
One could estimate this model with or without  s θ  as a control for the effect of human capital.   9
IV.  Findings 
Validity of the Learning Measure 
We begin by validating the learning measure. The most obvious concern is that it is noisy 
because of sampling error. To address this possibility, we estimate the share of the variance in 
the estimate of learning in each section that is due to learning in the section as opposed to 
sampling error.  To do this, we split each class into two equally-sized halves and calculate the 
covariance between learning in each half.  Intuitively, the idiosyncratic components of learning 
in each half of the course will be unrelated to each other, and the covariance between them will 
give the variance in learning in the section as a whole.  We now discuss the formal procedure. 
Let  sj s sj ε μ θ + =  denote the estimate of learning for portion  { } 2 , 1 ∈ j  of section s, which 
equals the learning in section s,  s μ , plus sampling error in portion j of the section,  sj ε . We 
estimate the covariance between the two randomly assigned halves of each section, 
Cov θs1,θs2 () =Cov μs1,μs2 () +Cov μs1,ε s2 ( )+Cov εs1,μs2 ( )+Cov ε s1,ε s2 () . 
The terms involving the sampling errors,  sj ε  drop out because they are orthogonal to the other 





2 1, s s s Var Cov μ θ θ = . This measure gives the standard deviation in learning across sections 
because it represents the variation in learning for students who took a particular section in the 
absence of any sampling error. We also calculate the share of our learning measure that 




















Here  s ε  denotes sampling error in the entire section. 
Second, in regression (2), where we generate our learning measure by relating future 
grades to future section dummy variables and base-section dummy variables, we test for the 
statistical significance of the base-section dummy variables (vector θ ) which measure base-
section learning. Third, we regress the base-section dummy variables from (2) on instructor   10
dummy variables. The second-stage model is given by 
s s s u I + =φ θ , 
where Is denotes a vector of dummy variables for the instructors teaching the base section. It 
seems reasonable to assume that learning varies across sections and across instructors.  Under 
this assumption, section dummy variables and instructor dummy variables are expected to be 
statistically significantly related to the learning measure (i.e., future grades).     
Table 2 reports results for the three courses. As shown in the top panel, there is 
substantial variation in learning across sections – the standard deviations range between .15 and 
.2 grade points. These differences imply that moving a student from a section with the mean 
level of learning to one with learning one standard deviation above the mean would raise his 
grades in all future economics classes from, say from a B- to more than half way to a B.  
Moreover, between 46% and 83% of the variance across base sections in the learning measure is 
due to learning at the section as opposed to noise, so our estimates of learning are quite precise.  
In other words, while (unobserved) individual factors such as motivation and ability account for 
the majority of the variation in future grades across students, only a minority (54% to 17%) of 
the variation in future grades across base sections is due to noise from sampling and the vast 
majority (46% and 83%) is signal. 
When we estimate (5), including controls for section characteristics, F-tests for the joint 
significance of the base-section dummy variables soundly reject the null hypothesis that base-
section grades are not important determinants of learning.  For all three courses, the P-values are 
less than .0001. 
As shown in the lower panel, more than half of the section-learning effects for principles 
of macroeconomics are due to instructor effects. Instructors account for 44% of the variation in 
the section-learning effects for intermediate microeconomics and 39% for principles of 
microeconomics. The null hypothesis of no instructor effects is also rejected with a P-value less 
than .0001 for macro-principles and with P-values of .01 for micro-principles and .1 for 
intermediate microeconomics. While much of the variation across sections is due to fixed   11
instructor effects, there is still considerable variation within instructors (due to variations in the 
rate of learning by doing or deterioration and idiosyncratic factors).  For this reason, we focus on 
section-level (rather than instructor-level) estimates of learning for most of the analyses. 
These results indicate that although they contain some sampling error, grades in future 
courses are a valuable measure of learning in base-sections.  The substantial variations in 
learning across sections and the strong effect of instructors on learning are also noteworthy and 
indicate the importance of evaluating instructors based on the learning that they produce. 
Principles of Microeconomics 
This section reports estimation results for equation (3). We begin with results for 
principles of microeconomics, and then discuss the results for principles of macroeconomics and 
intermediate microeconomics. We then turn to alternative explanations of our results, including 
those based on selection issues, and conclude with some additional analyses. These estimates 
and others like them include instructor random effects. 
The first column of table 3 reports a regression of student evaluations on the current 
course grade. We find that students in sections with higher grades rate their courses more highly 
than those in other sections. Column 2 reports a regression with only the learning measure, 
which is also found to be positively associated with evaluations though with a smaller coefficient 
than current grades. When both current grades and learning are included in the same regression 
(column 3), the effect of the current grade dominates, and the coefficient on learning is small and 
insignificant.
8  We remind the reader that both current grades and the learning measure are 
regression adjusted for observable student characteristics. 
The remaining columns examine a variety of other potential determinants of student 
evaluations. First, we include a set of instructor characteristics without controlling for grades or 
learning (column 4). Female instructors receive lower evaluations than men, as do foreign-born 
                                                 
8 If learning is multi-dimensional, grades in the current course may capture learning of material that is valuable 
outside of future courses, including skills as an economic actor or a citizen. By measuring learning using grades in 
future classes, the present analysis will not capture these other dimensions of learning. An alternative explanation 
for the strong relationship between evaluations and current grades is that teachers who expect to receive bad   12
instructors, although these differences are not statistically significant in all specifications. There 
are no discernable differences in evaluations between non-tenure track lecturers, graduate 
teaching associates, and tenure-track faculty.   
Differences in grading practices and learning may be responsible for the gender gap in 
evaluations as well as the substantial (but statistically insignificant) foreign-domestic gap.  To 
explore this possibility, column (5) includes both current grades and learning along with 
instructor characteristics.  Inclusion of these variables increases the gender and foreign-domestic 
gaps in evaluations slightly.  The above evidence suggests that students rate women and perhaps 
foreign instructors less favorably than others, possibly reflecting distaste/disrespect for such 
instructors or unmeasured differences in the course experience like language ability or teaching 
style. 
The regression in column (6) includes section characteristics; column (8) reports 
estimates with all of these variables, year dummy variables, and the response rate for the 
evaluations in the section.  In both regressions, the coefficient on the current course grade is 
significant and similar in magnitude.  To summarize other statistically significant findings, 
column (6) shows that students in honors and evening sections give higher evaluations than other 
students (i.e. those in non-honors, daytime sections).  Column (7) shows that the coefficients for 
honors and night classes as well as for female instructors all are significant after fully controlling 
for the available variables. The foreign effect remains large, but insignificant.   
The estimates in Table 3 consistently show a statistically significant effect of the current 
course grade.  Indeed, the coefficient becomes larger as more variables are controlled.  
According to column (8), a one standard-deviation change in the current course grade is 
associated with a large increase in evaluations – over a quarter of the standard deviation in 
evaluations.  Once current grades are controlled, learning, as measured by future grades, is not 
statistically significantly related to evaluations in any of the regressions. 
Our use of the actual current course grade as a measure of the expected grade in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
evaluations penalize their classes with harder exams or a harder curve.   13
course deserves some discussion.  As noted already, students likely have some idea of what 
grades they will receive based on formal or informal feedback received during the quarter. 
Alternatively, students may form expectations of their course grade based on the reputation the 
instructor’s grading in previous offerings of the course. We examine this last possibility by 
including in the regression the lagged grade – the mean grade in the last offering of the course by 
the instructor – along with the current grade.  Column (8) presents results without the lagged 
grade for the sample for which the lagged grade is available.  Including the lagged grade, in 
column (9) does not change the estimated coefficient of the current course grade or learning, and 
the coefficient for the lagged grade is itself small and statistically insignificant.  It appears that 
students base their evaluations on indications provided by the professor about the current course 
rather than on the professor’s reputation (at least based on recent offerings of the course). 
Individual Evaluation Items 
We use ten evaluative items, nine focusing on specific aspects of the course experience as 
well as the overall score, which has been the focus of the analysis thus far. Estimates for these 
individual items (not reported here, but available upon request) are quite similar to those for the 
overall evaluation measure. The current course grade is always associated with higher 
evaluations and the relationship is statistically significant at the 5% level in eight of the ten 
cases. None of the evaluation items are statistically significantly related to learning. 
One item directly measures learning, asking students whether they, “Learned greatly 
from instructor?” It is noteworthy that this measure is no more closely related to our learning 
measure based on future grades than any of the other items. This finding suggests that students 
are not able to evaluate the amount they learn in a course or that they base their estimates on the 
grades that they expect to receive. 
Principles of Macroeconomics and Intermediate Microeconomics 
This section reports results for principles of macroeconomics and intermediate 
microeconomics as a check. There are only 60 percent as many macro-principles sections as 
there are micro-principles sections and fewer of the students in macro-principles take subsequent   14
classes. Similarly, there are fewer intermediate economics sections than micro-principles (less 
than half as many) or macro-principles (three quarters as many) and fewer students take later 
classes making the estimates noisier.
9 Thus, both sets of estimates will be more noisy than those 
for principles of microeconomics. 
The results, which are reported in Appendix Table 1 in the same order as those for 
principles of microeconomics, are generally consistent with those for principles of 
microeconomics. For both principles of macroeconomics and intermediate microeconomics, 
grades in the current course are strongly related to student evaluations for later courses. In fact, 
the estimates are, if anything, stronger, than those for micro-principles. Learning is unrelated to 
evaluations once current grades are controlled. Again women and foreign born instructors tend to 
receive lower evaluations than men and domestic instructors, but these differences are not 
consistently statistically significant. Results, not reported here but available upon request, for 
individual evaluations items also show a strong relationship with current course grades but not 
learning. 
Robustness 
This section explores two robustness checks. One possibility is that learning in principles 
of microeconomics may be better captured by performance in other microeconomics classes. To 
explore this possibility we have estimated learning using grades in intermediate microeconomics 
only. The estimates are reported in the top panel of Table 4 and are similar to the previous 
estimates, with a strong positive relationship between current grades and student evaluations and 
a weak relationship between learning and student evaluations.  
Because we are often interested in the effectiveness of particular instructors, we have also 
re-estimated our models using instructor-level data. To do this, we estimate the weighted mean 
of student evaluations and of our measures of grades and learning for each section taught by an 
                                                 
9 While micro-principles is not a prerequisite for macro-principles, almost all students take micro-principles before 
macro-principles, so that almost all of the grades in the macro-principles classes are available to estimate learning 
for micro-principles, while for macro-principles, learning can only be estimated for students who take a third 
economics course. Similarly, many business majors require intermediate microeconomics, but no additional classes.   15
instructor estimated in equations (1) and (2). In these calculations, each section was weighted by 
the number of students in that section. Equation (3) is then estimated at the instructor level with 
these instructor-level means as the independent and dependent variables
10. (In the specifications 
that include section and instructor characteristics, the means of those variables are included.) 
These estimates, reported in the bottom panel of the table, show somewhat higher estimates of 
current grades than the section-level estimates, but the coefficient learning is small and 
statistically insignificant. 
Summary  
The highlights of what we found so far are: 
1.  There is a consistent positive relationship between grades in the current course and 
evaluations. This finding is robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls and 
specifications.  
2.  There is no evidence of association between learning and evaluations controlling for 
current course grades. 
3.  Learning is no more related to student evaluations of the amount learned in the course 
than it is to student evaluations of other aspects of the course. 
4.  In some cases women and foreign-born instructors receive lower evaluations than other 
instructors, all else equal. 
V. Alternative Explanations 
Through the various checks reported in Table 2, we feel confident that our measure of 
learning is valid. Our findings show that student evaluations are strongly related to grades and 
that learning, as measured by future grades, is unrelated to student evaluations once grades have 
been controlled. The obvious explanation for these findings is that grading leniency is an 
important determinant of evaluations and that students do not reward instructors who generate 
learning per se. There are, however, five other explanations that come to mind and this section 
                                                 
10 We do not include the lagged evaluation because it is ill-defined when these regressions are run for instructors as   16
investigates them and shows that they are unlikely to explain our results. 
First, the findings may indicate selection into courses – for example, the least able 
students may disproportionately take courses from the instructors with the best student 
evaluations, biasing downward our estimates of learning for the best instructors. Second, the 
results for learning may reflect selection into future classes. Our learning measure can only be 
constructed for students who take subsequent economics classes. Better performing students in 
one economics course may be more likely to take future economics classes. If more highly rated 
professors make economics more attractive particularly for students with low economics ability, 
the relationship between grades and whether students take additional classes will be weaker for 
students taking classes from the highly rated professors.  In this case, our learning measure will 
be biased downward for highly rated instructors relative to less highly rated ones, leading us to 
underestimate the effect of learning on evaluations. We will examine this possibility.  A third 
explanation is that students from more highly rated professors may be induced into taking more 
difficult future classes. We will also examine this possibility. A fourth interpretation is that the 
costs to students in courses where they learn much may offset the benefits they perceive. Lastly, 
students may be unable to gauge how much they have learned in their classes. The weak 
relationship between our learning measure and the evaluation item that specifically addresses 
learning, suggests that the last explanation may be the most relevant one.  We investigate these 
explanations below. 
Selection into Base Sections 
This section considers whether selection biases our estimates. There are a number of 
selection arguments. The simplest is that there may be selection into base sections, so that 
variations in learning and grades are due to differences in student ability.
11 As noted earlier, all 
the preceding estimates control for a rich set of student characteristics including ACT or SAT 
                                                                                                                                                             
opposed to individual courses.  Also, lagged grades did not matter in the previous models. 
11 Another selection possibility is that students who expect to receive bad grades drop classes and therefore do not 
complete evaluations (Becker and Powers [2001]). If, within a class, students expecting lower grades give lower 
evaluations, self-selection would raise both the observed average course grade and the observed evaluation.   17
scores and high school class rank, thereby mitigating this concern. For principles of 
microeconomics, we have also restricted the sample for which we estimate learning to students 
who took principles of microeconomics in the Fall of their first year.  These students presumably 
have little information about instructors. This strategy is similar to Hoffmann and Oreopoulos 
[2006]. Results were less precise but similar to those presented above. 
Selection into Future Classes 
There are other selection arguments. For example, the effect of learning, as measured by 
future grades, on evaluations may be biased downward if students with low ability in economics 
take more additional economics courses after taking a course from a highly rated instructor than 
after taking a course from a less highly rated instructor.
12 To test this hypothesis, we estimate 
logit models of whether student i takes subsequent economics courses, Future Classis. The first 
model is, 
FutureClassis =
1if esβ + XisΓ+WsΠ +εis > 0





Here  s e  denotes the evaluation in section s;  is X  denotes student characteristics; and  s W  denotes 
characteristics of the instructor and section. In addition to individual characteristics included 
above, in these regressions,  is X  includes dummy variables for the college that houses the 
student’s major and interactions between these dummy variables and a quadratic in time to 
account for (time-varying) differences in requirements to take economics classes across different 
units.
13 This model can be used to determine whether students take more economics classes after 
taking a class from a highly-rated instructors than they do after taking a class from a less highly-
rated instructor, in which case  0 ˆ > β . The second model is, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Unfortunately, our data do not permit us to identify students who dropped a course.  
12 Alternatively, students who are more interested in economics may rate their instructors better and continue with 
economics classes even if they are not as capable. Random variations across sections in student motivation might 
produce more low-quality students going on to take more economics classes when ratings are higher. These 
estimates also test for this hypothesis. 
13 Unfortunately, historic information on which programs require which economics courses is not available.   18
FutureClassis =
1if gisβ +gisesπ + XisΓ+Φs +ε is < 0





As above,  s e  denotes the evaluation in section s and  is X  denotes student characteristics;  is g  
gives the grade received by student i in section s and  s Φ  denotes a set of section dummy 
variables, which are estimated explicitly and account for differences across base sections in the 
probability of taking future courses. With section fixed effects, the instructor and section 
characteristics (including the direct effect of student evaluations) are captured by the section 
fixed effects. The parameter β  gives the difference between the probability of taking subsequent 
economics courses by students with higher grades relative to those with worse grades. The 
parameter π , on the interaction between grades and evaluations, is of particular interest. If 
0 > π  ( 0 < π ), then the relationship between students’ grades and the probability of taking 
future economics courses is stronger (weaker) in sections with higher evaluations. 
While one might have expected that students from sections with higher evaluations 
would be particularly likely to take additional economics classes, the estimates reported in the 
odd numbered columns of table 5 show little relationship between student evaluations and the 
number of subsequent economics classes taken. Thus, there is no evidence that students take 
more classes after having more highly rated instructors. Viewed from a revealed preference 
perspective, this result casts doubt on student evaluations as a measure of teaching quality.  For 
both principles of microeconomics and macroeconomics, students with higher high school class 
rank and better math ACT or SAT scores are more likely to take subsequent courses while those 
with higher verbal scores and women are less likely to take additional economics classes. The 
other controls are not systematically related to the probability of taking additional economics 
classes. 
The estimates in the even-numbered columns of the table show a strong positive 
relationship between grades in the current course and the number of subsequent economics 
classes taken for students in principles of microeconomics and principles of macroeconomics. 
The relationship is negative and significant for students in intermediate microeconomics courses.   19
The relationship between grades and the probability of taking future courses only depends on 
evaluations in intermediate microeconomics. Good students are particularly likely to take 
subsequent economics classes after taking intermediate microeconomics from a highly-rated 
instructor, which would bias the relationship between evaluations and learning upward. Here too, 
there is little evidence that selection explains the weak relationship between grades in subsequent 
classes and student evaluations. 
We also estimate our learning measure using a formal selection model. For these 
estimates, we look at students who took principles of microeconomics as their first principles 
course and their grades in principles of macroeconomics. Our instruments for whether students 
take principles of maroeconomics, which were excluded from the future grade equation from 
which learning was estimated, are a set of interactions between the college that housed the 
student’s major at the time of enrollment in principles of microeconomics and time. This is a 
good instrument, because it reflects exogenous changes in the requirements of majors and 
advising practices. We included college dummy variables in the equations for taking principles 
of macroeconomics and in the grade equation for principles of macroeconomics, so the selection 
model is estimated from variations over time in the share of principles of microeconomics 
students taking principles of macroeconomics within majors. 
The results, which are quite similar to those in table 3, are reported in Appendix Table 2.  
Consistent with the previous results, there is a strong relationship between student evaluations 
and grades, which is unaffected by the inclusion of learning. The learning measure is weakly 
related to evaluations. 
The Difficulty of Future Courses Taken 
Another selection argument focuses on the particular classes that students take. Students 
who take a course from a more highly rated professor may take additional classes that are more 
difficult than students whose prior course is from a less highly-rated instructor.  While the 
estimates of learning based on future grades include fixed effects for future courses, if a 
disproportionately large number of students from a particular class take courses that are more   20
difficult in the sense of yielding lower average grades for the same amount of initial knowledge, 
it will lead us to underestimate learning from those sections.  
Our data provide a convenient test for this hypothesis insofar as intermediate 
microeconomics (the third class taken by most students) is offered in two versions – a standard 
course and a calculus-based course, taken by roughly 13 percent of the students in our sample. 
For students who took an intermediate microeconomics class, we estimate 
HardIntermediateis =
1 if  esβ + XisΓ+ε is > 0





using a logit model. Here  is te Intermedia Hard  is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the person 
took the mathematical intermediate microeconomics class and 0 if the person took the less 
mathematical intermediate microeconomics class;  s e  denotes the evaluation in section s, and  is X  
denotes the student characteristics. The parameter β  indicates whether students who took 
sections with higher ratings were more or less likely to take the more mathematical intermediate 
class. 
The estimates are reported in Table 6. There is no relationship between student 
evaluations in principles of microeconomics or macroeconomics and the probability of taking the 
more mathematical intermediate microeconomics course. (For principles of macroeconomics the 
estimates indicate that students in more highly rated sections are actually less likely to take the 
more mathematical intermediate microeconomics course, although the coefficient is not 
statistically significant.) Not surprisingly, students who have higher math ACT or SAT scores 
are more likely to take the mathematically intensive class. 
These estimates indicate that the finding of no relationship between evaluations and 
learning is not due to this potential source of bias. Overall, we conclude that there is little 
evidence that selection (in a variety of forms) accounts for the weak relationship between 
evaluations and learning reported above. 
VI. Determinants of Learning and Grades 
The preceding estimates show that there is substantial variation in learning across   21
sections and that instructor effects account for much of this variation. This section considers how 
observable instructor characteristics are related to the learning measure and how current grades 
are related to learning and instructor characteristics. These are estimates of equations (4.1) and 
(4.2). Given that controlling for current grades eliminates the relationship between learning and 
evaluations, we anticipate that learning and current course grades are positively related. 
The results are reported in table 7. The first three columns report results for principles of 
microeconomics. They show no systematic relationship between instructor characteristics and 
current course grades. As expected, grades in the current course are positively related to 
learning, although the relationship is not statistically significant. This finding is consistent with 
instructors giving higher grades to sections that do better. Not surprisingly students in honors 
section of the course received higher grades and learned more than other students, and these 
results are highly statistically significant.   
Results for principles of macroeconomics, reported in columns (4) through (6), show that 
none of the observable instructor characteristics are related to learning, but that women tend to 
give lower grades. As shown in column (5), learning is positively, but not significantly, related 
to grades in the current course, but the previous results are robust to controlling for learning. 
Results for intermediate microeconomics, reported in columns (7) through (9) show that  
women tend to assign higher grades, but none of the other instructor characteristics is 
statistically significantly related to current grades. Students who took intermediate 
microeconomics from a foreign-born instructor learn less. Otherwise, none of the observable 
instructor characteristics is statistically significantly related to learning. As before, the current 
course grades are positively related to learning. 
It is noteworthy that Table 2 showed large instructor differences, but that the estimates in 
Table 7 show no consistent relationship between observable instructor characteristics and 
learning. This finding parallels the literature on teacher effects in primary and secondary schools, 
where teacher effects are found to be large, but observable teacher characteristics have only 
weak effects (see, for example, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain [2005]). Thus here, as in that   22
literature, the characteristics of instructors that matter the most are unobservable. 
VII.  Optimal Evaluation Criteria 
This section considers optimal evaluation criteria. Assume that evaluations depend on 
grades, gs; learning,  s l ; and an unobserved course experience, ξ s, according to 
  s s l s g s l g e ξ φ φ + + =  (3’) 
which is equivalent to (3) without instructor characteristics. If a direct measure of learning and 
unbiased estimates of  g φ ˆ  and  l φ ˆ  are available from (3 / 3’), it is possible to estimate the course 
experience directly from, 
  ( ) s l s g s s l g e x φ φ ˆ ˆ ˆ + − = .
14 (5) 
The  ˆ  x  s in (5) are the residuals from (3 / 3’). In other words, our measure of the course 
experience is evaluations regression-adjusted for grades and learning and (perhaps) instructor 
characteristics.
15 
With this information, instructors can be evaluated on the course experience they provide 
and the amount of human capital they produced. With a sense of social priorities, estimates of 
the course experience, human capital, and grades, administrators can reward instructors based on 
social welfare. 
Because much of the interest is in evaluating instructors, we analyze rankings of 
instructors for each course.
16 Figure 1.A shows a strong positive relationship between the 
estimated course experience for instructors and his or her student evaluations for principles of 
                                                 
14 We note that that this procedure attributes all factors that affect evaluations other than grades and learning to the 
course experience. If, as we have heard mentioned from time to time, instructors give out cookies or the like when 
administering evaluations, that will be attributed to a better course experience. Thus, in only regression adjusting 
evaluations, we may be placing too much emphasis on them, but we note that unadjusted evaluations are affected by 
these biases and our procedure has the advantage of adjusting evaluations for grading leniency. 
15 As noted by the editor the desirability and feasibility of controlling for instructor characteristics is not 
straightforward. For instance, one might want to adjust for gender to eliminate a gender-bias in evaluations, but it is 
not clear whether one would want to control for, say, experience. 
16 The course experience for each instructor is the mean of his or her residuals from regression (6) in Table 3, which 
controls for learning, grades, and section characteristics. The learning produced by each instructor (regression 
adjusted) is the mean of each instructor’s residual of a regression like that in column (6) of Table 3 where learning 
is the dependent variable and section characteristics are controlled.   23
microeconomics. The correlation between the two variables (shown in Table 8) is .94 indicating 
that regression-adjusting evaluations for grades and learning leaves most of the information 
intact. Panel B plots learning against student evaluations showing virtually no relationship 
between the amount of learning an instructor produces and his or her student evaluations. Given 
that learning and evaluations are essentially independent, it is not surprising that many of the 
instructors who do well on their evaluations do poorly on learning, while many of the instructors 
who do poorly on their evaluations produce a lot of learning. Thus, student evaluations provide 
no meaningful information about learning. The table also shows that the correlation between an 
instructors’ course experience and the amount of learning produced is low, .11. 
The remaining panels of the table show correlations for principles of macroeconomics 
and intermediate  microeconomics. Again, there is a strong relationship between the imputed 
course experience and student evaluations, but not between learning and student evaluations. In 
fact, in these courses, learning is negatively related to evaluations and the course experience, 
especially for principles of macroeconomics. 
The preceding results have two implications for the design of optimal evaluation criteria. 
First, rankings of instructors based on their course experience are quite similar to rankings of 
instructors based on raw student evaluations. Nevertheless, we prefer to rank instructors based 
on the course experience both because it controls for differences in grading leniency and because 
it eliminates the incentive to inflate grades. Second, rankings of instructors based on learning are 
markedly different from rankings of instructors based on student evaluations. The optimal 
assessment of instructors’ quality would not be based on raw student evaluations but rather on a 
weighted average of the course experience and learning variables, where the weights correspond 
to the relative importance that society assigns to these two objectives. 
The optimal assessment of instructor quality is easily implemented. It applies basic 
regressions to data that are available in machine-readable form at most or all institutions. Four 
points are worth highlighting. First, constructing optimal evaluations requires one to select the 
proper weights to be placed on learning relative to the course experience. Second, in order to   24
properly evaluate the amount of learning, enough time must elapse for students to be observed in 
subsequent classes. Third, while this measure has the advantage of weighting knowledge in 
proportion to its importance in future course work, which yields a high level of external validity, 
the method is most applicable for classes where subsequent coursework will build on the 
knowledge acquired in the base class.  Lastly, the procedure may raise selection concerns, and 
while we find little evidence for selection in the current context, matters may be different in 
other contexts. Of course, selection concerns also arise when using conventional student 
evaluations. 
VIII. Conclusions 
Our findings show that student evaluations are strongly related to grades and that 
learning, as measured by future grades, is unrelated to student evaluations once current grades 
have been controlled.  We also provide evidence that evaluations vary with instructor 
characteristics, the type of section, and composition of the class. We find, for example, that 
students sometimes give lower evaluations to women and to foreign-born instructors. We do not 
believe that our results are specific to our institutional setting, and expect our results to be 
qualitatively similar for higher education generally. 
Student evaluations of teaching differ from the ideal construct because they are affected 
by grade leniency and do not reflect learning produced in a course.  Even if student evaluations 
did not suffer from these two deficiencies, student evaluations would assign proper to weight to 
learning relative to the course experience only under the highly unlikely condition that students 
place the same weights on these items as the social planner.  Based on our analysis, we propose a 
procedure for optimally assessing instructor quality.  It is simple to use and the underlying data 
are readily available.   25
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Figure 1. Relationship Between Measures of Teaching Effectiveness – Principles of 
Microeconomics. 
Panel A. Student Evaluations and the Course Experience. 
  
Panel B. Student Evaluations and Learning. 
 
Note. Each point represents an instructor. 
   30
Table 1: Sample Characteristics 
Variables  Prin. Micro.  Prin. Macro.  Inter. Micro.  Variable Definition 
Number of Sections  190 119  86   
Number of Students  26,666 14,729  4,111   
Quality of Teaching  Mean  S. D. Mean S.  D. Mean S.  D.   
Overall  3.86 (0.44) 3.72 (0.54) 3.81 (0.64)  Overall rating of teaching quality 
Grades          
Current Course Grade 
2.61 (0.30) 2.71 (0.27) 2.72 (0.34) 
Current grade, the mean grade the instructor gives 
in the current class (grade leniency) 
Learning  2.81 (0.22) 2.84 (0.25) 2.83 (0.24)  Grades the in future Economics courses (regression-adjusted) 
Instructor Characteristics           
Instructor: Female  0.32 (0.47) 0.09 (0.28) 0.13 (0.34)  Instructor is female 
Instructor: Foreign Born  0.16 (0.37) 0.20 (0.40) 0.31 (0.47)  Instructor is foreign born 
Instructor: Lecturer  0.22 (0.41) 0.22 (0.42) 0.18 (0.38)  Instructor is a lecturer 
Instructor: Grad. Associate  0.11 (0.32) 0.15 (0.36) 0.22 (0.42)  Instructor is a graduate teaching associate 
Instructor: Has Ph.D.  0.81 (0.40) 0.76 (0.43) 0.78 (0.42)  Instructor has a PhD degree  
Instructor: Years since Ph.D.  21.58 (13.26) 19.93 (16.79) 10.69 (11.46)  Instructor years since PhD  
Instructor: Years at Institution  16.01 (11.96) 16.55 (14.35) 4.78  (5.22)  Instructor years at institution 
Student Characteristics            
Student: Female  0.46 (0.50) 0.37 (0.48) 0.30 (0.46)  Student is female 
Student: Black  0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.26) 0.06 (0.24)  Student is black 
Student: Hispanic  0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.12)  Student is Hispanic 
Student: HS class rank  55.76  (34.39) 54.95 (34.28) 42.59 (38.46)  Student High School rank 
Student: ACT English  22.03  (4.41) 22.05 (4.40) 22.25 (4.81)  Student ACT English 
Student: Math  23.13  (4.39)  23.45 (4.26) 23.80 (4.47)  Student ACT math 
Student: Reasoning  22.86  (3.97)  23.03 (3.95) 23.43 (4.24)  Student ACT reasoning 
Student: SAT Verbal   52.04  (8.94) 51.58 (9.21) 51.14  (10.84)  Student SAT verbal 
Student: SAT Math  55.27  (9.09) 55.87 (8.88) 56.79 (9.91)  Student SAT math 
Class Characteristics            
Multi-Section Class  0.68  (0.47)  0.66  (0.48)  N/A  N/A  Class is a large lecture with multiple small recitation sections 
Honors  Class  0.06 (0.24) 0.07 (0.26)  N/A  N/A  Class is a honors class 
Night  Class  0.14 (0.35) 0.13 (0.34) 0.26  (0.44)  Class is a night class 
Calculus  Class  N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.12  (0.33)  Course is calculus based 
Response  Rate  0.54 (0.21) 0.54 (0.19) 0.62  (0.14)  Response rate on SET survey 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.   31
Table 2: Tests of Grades in Future Sections as Measures of Base-Section Learning. 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Base Course:  Micro-Principles  Macro-Principles Intermediate  Micro 
Standard Deviation in Learning across Sections 
Standard deviation  0.146 0.192  0.152 
Relative to variation in future 
grades across sections  0.672  0.831  0.458 
Test for Joint Significance of Base-Section Dummy Variables as Determinants of Learning in Equation (2) 
F-Statistic  2.99  3.56 3.56 
Degrees of Freedom 
(Numerator, Denominator) 
(327, 34204)  (297, 20866)  (150, 9106) 
P-Value <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
Base-Section Instructors as Determinants of Learning 
F-Statistic for Joint 
Significance of Instructor-
Effects 
1.7 3.51  1.52 
Degrees of Freedom 
(Numerator, Denominator) 
(52, 137)  (31,  87)  ( 29, 56) 
P-Value 0.008  <.0001  0.0904 
R
2 of Instructor Effects  0.392  0.555  0.44 
 Table 3: Determinants of SET Overall Rating – Principle Microeconomics 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Current Course Grade  0.44***    0.40***    0.42*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.44*** 0.48*** 
  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) 
Learning    0.25** 0.14    0.13  0.09 -0.05 -0.19 -0.17 
   (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11) (0.14) (0.18) (0.19) 
Lag  of  Current  Course  Grade           -0.00 
           ( 0 . 1 2 )  
Instructor:  Female       -0.27*  -0.28*  -0.26*  -0.10  -0.14 
        (0.16) (0.15)    (0.15) (0.23) (0.19) 
Instructor: Foreign Born        -0.16 -0.24    -0.23 -0.48*  -0.53** 
        (0.18) (0.17)    (0.17) (0.26) (0.21) 
Instructor:  Lecturer      0.04  0.07    0.04  -0.09  -0.07 
        (0.28) (0.26)    (0.28) (0.37) (0.30) 
Instructor: Graduate Student        0.05 0.02    0.06 0.12 0.06 
        (0.55) (0.52)    (0.56) (0.71) (0.58) 
Instructor:  Has  Ph.D.        -0.01 -0.06    -0.13 -0.28 -0.28 
        (0.57) (0.54)    (0.57) (0.77) (0.62) 
Instructor: Years since Ph.D.        0.00 0.00    0.01 0.01 0.00 
        (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Instructor: Years at Institution        0.00 0.00    0.00 0.00 0.00 
        (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Multi-Section  Class        0.05  -0.08  -0.11  -0.07 
        (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.18) 
Honors  Class        0.22**  0.21**  0.27**  0.27** 
        (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.13) 
Night  Class        0.15**  0.16**  0.19**  0.18* 
        (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
Response  Rate         0.03  -0.06  -0.08 
         (0.20)  (0.25)  (0.26) 
Constant  4.02*** 3.77*** 3.97*** 3.93*** 4.20*** 3.87*** 4.02*** 4.12*** 4.27*** 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.58) (0.55) (0.09) (0.63) (0.89) (0.77) 
Includes  Year  Fixed  Effects         Yes  Yes  Yes 
Includes Student 
Characteristics as Controls in 
First Stage 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  190 190 190 190 190 190 190 133 133 
R-square  0.1283 0.0224 0.1379 0.0057 0.2036 0.2319 0.2772 0.4865 0.5335 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates include random effects for instructors. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. Table 4: Determinants of SET Overall Rating – Principle Microeconomics – Robustness Checks 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Section-Level Estimates, Learning Measured by Performance in Intermediate Microeconomics 
Current Course Grade  0.37***    0.38***    0.38*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 
  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) 
Learning (Measured by 
Performance in Intermediate 
Microeconomics) 
 
  0.02 -0.01    -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.09 -0.11 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) 
Lag  of  Current  Course  Grade           0.20 
           ( 0 . 1 4 )  
Observations  175 175 175 175 175 175 175 122 122 
R-square  0.1162 0.0014 0.1156 0.0011 0.1181 0.2165 0.2182 0.4803 0.5034 
 
Instructor-Level Estimates, Learning Measured by Performance in All Future Economics Classes 
Current Course Grade  0.56**    0.56**    0.64**  0.75**  0.64*     
  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.26)  (0.29)  (0.33)    
Learning (Measured by 
Performance in All Future 
Classes) 
 
 -0.06  0.02  -0.00  0.03  0.08    
  (0.30) (0.29)    (0.30) (0.30) (0.33)     
Observations  53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
R-square  0.093 0.001 0.093 0.141 0.248 0.138 0.302 0.381 0.508 
Includes  Year  Fixed  Effects         Yes  Yes  Yes 
Includes Instructor 
Characteristics 
     Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Includes Section 
Characteristics 
      Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Includes Student 
Characteristics as Controls in 
First Stage 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates in the top panel include random effects for instructors. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. For the instructor-level estimates, we construct the weighted mean of student evaluations and of our measures of grades and 
learning for each section taught by an instructor estimated in equations (1) and (2). In these calculations, each section was weighted by the 
number of students in that section. Equation (3) is then estimated at the instructor level with these instructor-level means as the independent and 
dependent variables. In the specifications that include section and instructor characteristics, the means of those variables are included. 
 Table 5: Determinants of the Taking Subsequent Economics Courses 
 
  Principles of Micro  Principles of Macro  Intermediate Micro 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SET Overall Rating  0.06    0.07    -0.01   
  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.08)  
Course  Grade   0.54***  1.02***  -0.43** 
   (0.14)  (0.21)  (0.20) 
SET Overall Rating * Course Grade    -0.00    -0.09    0.18*** 
   (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Student:  Female  -0.51*** -0.49*** -0.20*** -0.16***  -0.14  -0.14 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10) 
Student: Black  -0.03  0.14***  -0.26***  -0.05  -0.20  -0.17 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.17) (0.17) 
Student: Hispanic  0.14  0.20*  -0.15  -0.04  -0.31  -0.34 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.35) (0.35) 
Student: High School Rank  0.00***  -0.00  0.00***  -0.00  -0.01***  -0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Student: ACT English  -0.03***  -0.04***  -0.01  -0.02***  0.01  0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Student:  ACT  Math  0.04*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.03***  0.02  0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Student: ACT Reasoning  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Student: SAT Verbal  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Student: SAT Math  0.02***  0.01**  0.03***  0.02***  0.01  0.02 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Multi-Section Class  0.27**  0.08  0.05  1.27***     
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.22)     
Honors Class  0.46***  1.81***  0.15  -0.96*     
  (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.49)     
Night  Class  -0.02  -0.09 -0.19** -0.06 -0.50***  -1.12*** 
  (0.09) (0.18) (0.09) (0.12) (0.15) (0.26) 
Calculus  Class       0.55***  -1.16*** 
       (0.17)  (0.19) 
Instructor:  Female  -0.10*   0.16  -0.25  
  (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.16)  
Instructor: Foreign Born  -0.12    0.14    -0.17   
  (0.09)  (0.14)  (0.15)  
Instructor:  Lecturer  0.09   -0.39**   0.58  
  (0.10)  (0.18)  (0.39)  
Instructor: Graduate Student  0.19    -0.75***       
  (0.24)  (0.20)      
Instructor: Has Ph.D.  0.25    -0.88***    0.12   
  (0.24)  (0.19)  (0.17)  
Instructor: Years since Ph.D.  -0.01*    0.03***    -0.01   
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Instructor: Years at Institution  0.00    -0.03***    0.01   
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  
Constant -313.73  -347.94  311.92  1,757.28  -686.29  -393.95 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Includes Section Fixed Effects    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Controls for Inclusion of  High School Rank & SAT/ ACT  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  26575 26335 11164 10967  3989  3912 
 
Note: Estimates from Logit models. Standard errors, which are clustered at the section-level, in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 6: Determinants of Whether Students Subsequently Take Calculus-Based Intermediate 
Microeconomics  
 
   (1)  (2) 
   Micro-Principles  Macro-Principles 
SEI Overall Rating  0.15  -0.18 
 (0.20)  (0.14) 
Instructor: Female  0.21  -0.47* 
 (0.16)  (0.25) 
Instructor: Foreign Born  0.05  -0.01 
 (0.26)  (0.24) 
Instructor: Lecturer  -0.17  -0.00 
 (0.36)  (0.33) 
Instructor: Graduate Student  -0.01  0.39 
 (0.78)  (0.44) 
Instructor: Has Ph.D.  0.23  -0.08 
 (0.68)  (0.44) 
Instructor: Years since Ph.D.  0.00  -0.01 
 (0.01)  (0.02) 
Instructor: Years at Institution 0.00  0.01 
 (0.01)  (0.02) 
Student: Female  -0.07  -0.27* 
 (0.15)  (0.16) 
Student: Black  0.66*  0.51* 
 (0.34)  (0.30) 
Student: Hispanic  0.49  0.32 
 (0.38)  (0.45) 
Student: High School Rank  0.00  0.00 
 (0.01)  (0.00) 
Student: ACT English  0.00  -0.01 
 (0.02)  (0.03) 
Student: ACT Math  0.16***  0.13*** 
 (0.02)  (0.03) 
Student: ACT Reasoning  0.03  0.02 
 (0.03)  (0.03) 
Student: SAT Verbal  -0.01  0.00 
 (0.02)  (0.02) 
Student: SAT Math  0.08***  0.06*** 
 (0.02)  (0.02) 
Multi-Section Class  -0.22  -0.51* 
 (0.37)  (0.30) 
Honors Class  0.43  0.80*** 
 (0.37)  (0.27) 
Night Class  0.08  -0.83*** 
 (0.33)  (0.24) 
Includes Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Controls for Inclusion of High 
School Ranks and SAT / ACT  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2184 2511 
 
Note: Estimates from logit models. Standard errors, which are clustered at the section-
level, in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Table 7: Determinants of Course Grades and Learning 
 
    (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Principles of Microeconomics    Principles of 
Macroeconomics 
 Intermediate  Microeconomics 



















Learning    0.08       0.15      0.25*   
    (0.10)      (0.10)      (0.13)   
Instructor: Female  0.06  0.05  0.06    -0.22* -0.24*  0.07    0.26** 0.27**  -0.07 
 (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.06)    (0.13)  (0.14) (0.08)    (0.13) (0.13) (0.08) 
Instructor: Foreign Born  0.11  0.11  0.04   0.07  0.09  -0.08  -0.01  0.04  -0.14** 
 (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.06)    (0.12)  (0.13) (0.07)    (0.12) (0.12) (0.07) 
Instructor: Lecturer  -0.01  -0.02  0.13   0.07  0.08  -0.00  -0.51  -0.51  0.07 
 (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.10)    (0.19)  (0.20) (0.11)    (0.33) (0.35) (0.19) 
Instructor: Grad. Associate  0.20  0.18  0.20   0.30  0.30  0.04        
  (0.29)  (0.30)  (0.20)   (0.27) (0.28)  (0.14)        
Instructor: Has Ph.D.  0.10  0.08  0.10   0.56*  0.55*  0.02    0.12  0.12  -0.03 
 (0.29)  (0.30)  (0.20)    (0.29)  (0.30) (0.16)    (0.15) (0.15) (0.09) 
Instructor: Years since Ph.D.  -0.00  -0.00  0.00   -0.02 -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)    (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Instructor: Years at Institution -0.00  -0.00  0.00    0.01  0.01 -0.00    -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)    (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)    (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Multi-Section Class  0.13  0.14  -0.05   -0.05  -0.02  -0.13        
  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.08)   (0.13) (0.13)  (0.10)        
Honors  Class  0.25*** 0.24***  0.25***   0.21*** 0.17**  0.29***        
  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.05)   (0.07) (0.08)  (0.07)        
Night Class  -0.07  -0.07  0.01    -0.01 -0.01  -0.04    0.05  0.07  -0.01 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04)    (0.07)  (0.07) (0.06)    (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Calculus-Based  Class                0.01  -0.03  0.19*** 
                (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
Constant -0.91***  -0.89**  -0.18    0.40  0.45 -0.28*    -1.00***  -0.78***  -0.94*** 
   (0.34)  (0.35)  (0.24)    (0.30)  (0.31) (0.17)    (0.15) (0.19) (0.12) 
Number of Sections  190  190  190    119  119  119    86  86  86 
R-Square 0.2001  0.1971  0.4908    0.3695 0.3744  0.6094  0.4488  0.4783  0.2916 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates include random effects for instructors. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. Table 8: Correlations between Measures of Teacher Quality 
 









Student Evaluation  1     
Course Experience  0.9373  1   
Learning (Regression Adjusted)  0.0404  0.1076  1 
Principle  Macroeconomics     
Student Evaluation  1     
Course Experience  0.9590  1   
Learning (Regression Adjusted)  -0.2629  -0.2459  1 
Intermediate  Microeconomics     
Student Evaluation  1     
Course Experience  0.8169  1   
Learning (Regression Adjusted)  -0.0943  -0.0890  1 
 
Note: The course experience is the mean of each instructor’s residual of regression (6) in Table 3, which controls for learning, grades, 
and section characteristics. Learning (regression adjusted) is the mean of each instructor’s residual of a regression like that in column 
(6) of Table 3 where learning is the dependent variable and section characteristics are controlled.Appendix Table 1: Determinants of SET Overall Rating – Principle Macroeconomics and Intermediate Microeconomics 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Principles  of  Macroeconomics           
Current  Course  Grade  0.60***   0.55***   0.56*** 0.56*** 0.47*** 1.01*** 0.94*** 
  (0.15)   (0.16)   (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) 
Learning    0.29**  0.13   0.17 0.16 0.10 0.04 0.02 
    (0.14) (0.14)   (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.22) (0.21) 
Lag  of  Current  Course  Grade          0.53** 
          ( 0 . 2 3 )  
Instructor:  Female     -0.60**  -0.46*   -0.40  0.38  0.53* 
     (0.30)  (0.27)   (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.28) 
Instructor:  Foreign  Born     -0.19  -0.28   -0.38  -0.17  -0.18 
     (0.27)  (0.24)   (0.24)  (0.20)  (0.19) 
Instructor:  Lecturer     0.22  0.00   -0.24  -0.90***  -0.96*** 
     (0.41)  (0.37)   (0.37)  (0.31)  (0.30) 
Instructor:  Graduate  Student     -0.00  -0.33   -0.56  -1.41***  -1.59*** 
     (0.63)  (0.57)   (0.53)  (0.40)  (0.39) 
Instructor:  Has  Ph.D.     0.01  -0.31   -0.23  -1.81***  -2.24*** 
     (0.67)  (0.61)   (0.57)  (0.50)  (0.52) 
Instructor:  Years  since  Ph.D.     -0.00  -0.00   -0.01  0.05***  0.06*** 
     (0.02)  (0.02)   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Instructor:  Years  at  Institution     -0.01  -0.02   -0.03  -0.08***  -0.09*** 
     (0.02)  (0.02)   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Number  of  Sections  119 119 119 119 119 119 119 85  85 
R-Square  0.1262 0.0272 0.1266 0.2831 0.3991 0.1219 0.4568 0.6424 0.6715 
Intermediate  Microeconomics           
Current  Course  Grade  0.62***   0.63***   0.68*** 0.57*** 0.52**  0.98**  1.05** 
  (0.22)   (0.23)   (0.25) (0.20) (0.23) (0.39) (0.41) 
Learning    0.04  -0.05   -0.02 -0.24 -0.30 -0.56 -0.52 
    (0.27) (0.27)   (0.28) (0.23) (0.23) (0.40) (0.41) 
Lag  of  Current  Course  Grade          -0.33 
          ( 0 . 4 5 )  
Instructor:  Female     0.21  0.07   0.26  -0.85**  -0.75* 
     (0.27)  (0.26)   (0.31)  (0.38)  (0.41) 
Instructor:  Foreign  Born     -0.06  -0.16   -0.24  -0.83***  -0.83*** 
     (0.24)  (0.23)   (0.29)  (0.22)  (0.22) 
Instructor:  Lecturer     0.16  0.20   0.40  -0.03  -0.02 
     (0.68)  (0.65)   (0.84)  (0.60)  (0.60) 
Instructor:  Has  Ph.D.     -0.39  -0.42   -0.63*  -0.29  -0.34 
     (0.29)  (0.27)   (0.36)  (0.35)  (0.36) 
Instructor:  Years  since  Ph.D.     0.00  0.01   0.00  0.01  0.01 
     (0.03)  (0.02)   (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Instructor:  Years  at  Institution     0.02  0.01   0.01  0.01  0.01 
     (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Number  of  Sections  86 86 86 86 86 86 86 53 53 
R-Square  0.0801 0.0004 0.0809 0.0344 0.1644 0.1634 0.3665 0.6160 0.6224 
Includes  Student  Characteristics           Yes  Yes  Yes 
Includes  Course  Characteristics        Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Includes  Response  Rate         Yes  Yes  Yes 
Includes  Year  Dummy  Variables         Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates include random effects for instructors. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Appendix Table 2: Determinants of SET Overall Rating – Principle Microeconomics – Selection Corrected Learning Measure 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Current Course Grade  0.35***    0.34***    0.34*** 0.28** 0.24** 0.52*** 0.39** 
  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.18) 
Learning (Selection 
Corrected)   0.10  0.06  0.08 0.05 0.07 -0.10  -0.09 
   (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09) (0.10) (0.17) (0.17) 
Lag  of  Current  Course  Grade           0.29* 
           ( 0 . 1 5 )  
Instructor:  Female      -0.37***  -0.36***    -0.31**  -0.30**  -0.29** 
        (0.13) (0.13)    (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
Instructor: Foreign Born        -0.29**  -0.30**    -0.34**  -0.87***  -0.81*** 
        (0.14) (0.14)    (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
Instructor:  Lecturer      -0.18  -0.08    -0.05  -0.10  0.04 
        (0.22) (0.22)    (0.23) (0.21) (0.22) 
Instructor: Graduate Student        -0.51 -0.41    -0.14 -0.40 -0.19 
        (0.44) (0.44)    (0.47) (0.43) (0.44) 
Instructor:  Has  Ph.D.        -0.32 -0.28    -0.06 -0.32 -0.14 
        (0.46) (0.46)    (0.47) (0.42) (0.42) 
Instructor: Years since Ph.D.        -0.01 -0.01    -0.01  -0.02**  -0.02** 
        (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Instructor: Years at Institution        -0.01 -0.00    -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
        (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Multi-Section  Class        0.08  0.05  0.17  0.25 
        (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.18)  (0.18) 
Honors  Class        0.28***  0.22**  0.49***  0.55*** 
        (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
Night  Class        0.15*  0.14*  0.24**  0.28** 
        (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Response  Rate         0.21  -0.21  -0.12 
         (0.21)  (0.30)  (0.30) 
Includes  Year  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number  of  Sections  183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 129 
R-Square  0.2156 0.1245 0.2244 0.2797 0.4116 0.3441 0.4930 0.7390 0.7490 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates include random effects for instructors. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. Our instruments for whether students take principles of macroeconomics are interactions between the college that housed the student’s major 
at the time of enrollment in principles of microeconomics and time (and its square). The reported estimates include dummy variables for the 
colleges. 
 